Through its history, the United States Air Force has struggled with the most efficient and effective way to provide for its own air base ground defense. This monograph submits a solution intended to end the debate. In an effort to provide the most comprehensive answer possible, the method used to develop this monograph contains two key aspects. The first of these aspects is a historical study of the Air Force's air base ground defense dilemma. Included is a look at the US Army Air Forces' attempts to solve the problem in World War II. The initial history is followed by a study of the US Air Force's continuing efforts to solve the dilemma starting with a study of air base defense issues in Korea and continuing through the current Global War on Terrorism. The second key aspect is a historical case study of two Air Forces that faced similar issues. The first of these is the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force and the second is the German Luftwaffe of World War II. Each employed different methodologies and subsequently achieved different results. The results of the analysis contained in this monograph provide a clear answer. To finally solve the air base ground defense problem, the US Air Force will have to accept risk with regards to resource constraints in order to mitigate risk to expeditionary operations. Failure to embrace the capability necessary to engage and defeat threats to deployed airmen and resources in the future will have a direct impact on the US Air Force's ability to sustain global reach and global power in the Twenty-First Century.