This study attempts to determine if the Clausewitzian concept of the culminating point is useful in planning offensive operations at the operational level of war. The study postulates that the Army's AirLand battle doctrine includes theoretical concepts, such as culminating point, which are not clearly understood by many professional officers. Also, if the culminating point of the attack is an important concept, then it deserves a complete explanation which must be incorporated into the Army's doctrinal manuals. The study analyzes two major historical campaigns, the German counteroffensive against the Russians in the Kharkov campaign of January-March 1943 and Operation CRUSADER conducted by the British in North Africa, November 1941, to demonstrate the usefulness of the concept under investigation. The conclusion of this study is that the culminating point of the attack is an important concept which must be clearly understood by operational commanders. The historical analysis demonstrates how this understanding can lead to overwhelming success while a lack of understanding may prohibit decisive gains. Also, the importance of this concept requires that it be covered in greater detail and thoroughly explained within the Army's operational doctrine.