Air/Land Battle doctrine stresses the need for Army units to fight successfully out-numbered. This dictum implies the conduct of defensive operations at the beginning of a war. The shift to offensive operations, the counterattack, can be the key to fighting out-numbered and winning. This monograph discusses the selection of the objective of a counterattack, and the proper conduct of the counterattack. The paper begins with an examination of classical and modern works on military theory and doctrine in order to determine the theoretical basis for the use of the counterattack as a defensive tactic. A lack of modern doctrine concerning the use of counterattacks becomes quickly evident. Next examined are the use of counterattacks in the battles of Cowpens, Austerlitz, Second Bull Run, and the experience of Task Force Kean at the beginning of the battles of the Pusan perimeter during the Korean War. The comparison of the results of battlefield use of the counterattack with the considerations of the theorists fills in the apparent gap in doctrine. The paper concludes with observations on practical objectives for counterattacks, the proper size for a counterattacking force, the selection of the physical target of the counterattack, and the timing of the counterattack.