This monograph considers whether operational art and the operational level of conflict are viable constructs for Canada or other middle-powers. Like most of America's close allies, Canada quickly followed the US lead by adopting these operational concepts into its service and joint doctrine. However, these concepts are framed in a great-power context of large-force, large-theater, high-intensity operations that is of questionable relevance to middle-powers, and their small, tactically focused militaries. This study first examines operational doctrine and theory in order to distill operational art into terms applicable across the spectrum of conflict and scale of operations. It then explores Canadian strategic imperatives and the Canadian Army's historical experience, to determine if and how the operational art and level have been practiced in the past, and whether they are feasible, acceptable and suitable constructs for the Canadian military today. This monograph shows that in today's complex operating environment, Canada is coming under increasing pressure to take more prominent roles in coalition operations. To meet this challenge, and to ensure Canada retains the ability to exert strategic influence, the Canadian Forces need to refocus on fielding salient, self-contained forces that can think operationally and function at the operational level.