
GIVE THE PERFECT GIFT
Erin Mills Town Centre Gift Cards are the perfect choice for your gift giving needs.Purchase gift cards at kiosks near the food court or centre court, at Guest Services, or click below to purchase online.PURCHASE HEREHome
The Evolution Of U.s. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 19451980
Indigo
Loading Inventory...
The Evolution Of U.s. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 19451980
By None
Current price: $81.42


By None
The Evolution Of U.s. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 19451980
Current price: $81.42
Loading Inventory...
Size: Kobo eBook
*Product information may vary - to confirm product availability, pricing, shipping and return information please contact Indigo
The development of U.S. Army nuclear doctrine—policies, plans, procedures, tactics, and techniques—since World War II, its impact on Army forces, and its role in future wars is the subject of this policy-oriented analysis. The definition of Army nuclear doctrine advanced by the author clearly implies a distinction between policy for the employment of nuclear weapons as determined by the president and the role adduced by the Army. Dr. Rose suggests that developments—both nuclear and conventional—in U.S. Army tactical doctrine have been more responsive to political preferences held by national authorities than to the real nature of the potential threat and rigors of the nuclear battlefield. Further, he argues that the type of war preparations favored by U.S. political authorities over the last fifteen years and the type of war for which the Soviet Union is preparing differ markedly, making the U.S. Army poorly prepared for a major war.
The development of U.S. Army nuclear doctrine—policies, plans, procedures, tactics, and techniques—since World War II, its impact on Army forces, and its role in future wars is the subject of this policy-oriented analysis. The definition of Army nuclear doctrine advanced by the author clearly implies a distinction between policy for the employment of nuclear weapons as determined by the president and the role adduced by the Army. Dr. Rose suggests that developments—both nuclear and conventional—in U.S. Army tactical doctrine have been more responsive to political preferences held by national authorities than to the real nature of the potential threat and rigors of the nuclear battlefield. Further, he argues that the type of war preparations favored by U.S. political authorities over the last fifteen years and the type of war for which the Soviet Union is preparing differ markedly, making the U.S. Army poorly prepared for a major war.


















