The Possibility of Moral Community defends the claim that there could be a moral community, a community of rational creatures somewhat like ourselves living together in ways informed and regulated by shared normative standards and understandings. These creatures aim to live together in this way and expect each other to conform to that shared aim. Those who fail to do so are deemed to have acted wrongly and held responsible for doing so. This possibility is not dependent on the truth of such large metaphysical claims as robust normative realism and libertarian free will. And even if these large metaphysical claims are false, moral community remains possible without those who compose it needing to commit any errors, believe any fictions, live any lies, or be subject to any illusions. There is nothing they need to make-believe or to pretend. This possibility is vindicated by developing and defending the view that our normative thought and talk expresses who we are. Or more exactly who we are when we are, by our own lights, at our best. This is something shaped by our history, our nature and the passions in our souls. It is something contingent, certainly, but it is idle to be troubled by that if it is also something we are able to take ownership of and agree to inhabit together as a space of mutual normative expectation and responsibility.